didn't respect the unspoken, but well-understood rules, was likely to find the lines to his traps cut. In some markets, illegal drugs for one, the knife is taken to the violator's throat.
In modern, civilized economies, rules are enforced by public institutionslegislatures, courts, regulatory agencies, central banks. The social contract includes protection of labor, the environment and public health from the brutalities of unconstrained capitalism.
The precise content of a market's rules has major consequences for who gets to be rich and who gets to be poor. Therefore, all markets have a politics. Political science, as a famous American scholar once observed, is the study of "who gets what." The same basic subject of economics.
When markets expand their boundaries, so must the rules. In our own history, advances in technology, business organization and westward migration expanded the US economy from a series of regional markets, regulated by state governments, to a continental economy regulated primarily by the Federal government. Note that the Federal government did not just impose rules on trade among the states, but market rules within the states as well. Because we had a constitution guaranteeing some form of democracy and a Bill of Rights, the new rules were subject to public debate. Political parties evolved around class-based conflicts over land settlement, the gold standard, antitrust, child labor, social security, environmental protections and so forth.
Today, technology, business organization and migration are relentlessly expanding markets beyond the capacity of individual nation-states to regulate them. Since business must have rules, a constitution for the global market is being written -at the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.
Befitting a world dominated by one superpower, the US Treasury and the Pentagon play leadership roles. Because there is no prior framework of democracy or accountability, the new constitution is being written piecemeal, in secret, and publicly unacknowledgedexcept for an occasional slip of the tongue, as in the case of Signor Ruggiero. To the typical reader of the world's major newspapers or watcher of the nightly news, the rules for a borderless economy seem to be set by a sort of parliament of nations, where finance ministers at the IMF, trade ministers at the WTO, and economic ministers at the World Bank pursue their national interests. Interestingly enough, the new constitution is not being written at the United Nations, which is presumably our principal world legislature. The reason for this will be clear shortly.
This notion of "national" interests dominates the language of globalization. Thus, the reports from the recent WTO meetings in Cancun speak of US interests vs. Brazil's interests vs. South Africa's interests, etc. The implication of this language is that when George Bush, or Lula, or Thabo Mbeki turn their gaze to foreign economic affairs, the domestic conflict over "who gets what" stops at the border. National interests are then aggregated into international blocs. Global economic politics is presented as a conflict between rich countries and poor countries, the North and the South, the producers of raw materials and the producers of software.
Yet, as the late Michael Harrington once remarked to me, there are poor people in rich countries and rich people in poor countries. And just as politics in an expanding American economy developed around class and other interests across state lines, a similar process is going on in the current globalizing economy. As the organization of production, finance and marketing becomes increasingly global, the distribution of income, wealth and power tends to follow lines of class, occupation and industry that cross borders.
The individuals who negotiate trade and investment agreements and who sit on the boards of the IMF, the World Bank and the various international financial agencies formally represent different national interests. But they increasingly act as agents for an international class interest as well. Globalization has created a global elite -people whose economic and political status brings them together regardless of nationality. They include the leaders of multinational corporations and their financiers, their political partners, and their clients and retainers among the punditry, the military, the international bureaucracies and the academy.
After a speech I gave a few years ago at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York -a retired State Department official bluntly underlined the fundamental reality.
"What you don't understand," he said, "is that when we negotiate economic agreements with these poorer countries, we are negotiating with people from the same class. That is, people whose interests are like ours." I call this global governing class the Party of Davos, after the Swiss town that is the site of one of the annual conferences of the global elite. As Adam Smith reminded us: "People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public." We should expect no less when people from different countries with the same interests meet at the global economy's watering holes for merriment, diversion…and conspiracy. It would be odd if it were otherwise. So it should be no surprise the rules of the global market written by the Party of Davos protect and promote the positions of its membership -those who control large amounts of capital. The rules thus encourage trade de-regulation, privatization, weakening of unions, financial market liberalization, and a general shredding of the social contract. This is not to say that the world's governing class is always of exactly one mind, or that nationality plays no role in the pursuit of self-interest. Bankers in Florida see the world differently than bankers in Oregon. Those in London have a different perspective from those in Singapore. But when it comes to protecting the generic rights of capital, the elites of Florida, Oregon, London and Singapore are united.
You can see this clearly in the way in which issues of concern to other classes are, by joint agreement, left out of the agendas of the IMF, the WTO and other international forums, and therefore out of the concerns of the global constitution. These include the rights of labor, the protection of the environment, public health, community stability…and of course democracy and accountability. is to constrain it -making it subject to democracy and accountability. This is why the constitution of the new world order is not being written at the United Nations. The UN is too unwieldy, too transparent and too susceptible to Porto Alegre-ish sentiments.
That the new rules of globalization reflect the interests of the multinational investor is beyond reasonable dispute. The inspiration for these rules comes from the ideological triumph of a reactionary "free market fundamentalism" within our own superpower, which then spread to other Anglo-American style economies, and beyond. I use the word reactionary, rather than conservative, because the thrust of free-market fundamentalism is not to conserve things as they are, but to rip them up and return to a 19 th century world of dog-eat-dog, where the dollar is king.
Whatever other separate goals its members might pursue, the common agenda of the Party of Davos is to break the bargaining power of labor. By labor, I do not mean just labor unions, but the vast majority of the people on this planet who must work in order to live -from industrial and service workers in advanced countries to rural laborers and marginal peasants in the most economically backward corners of the globe. The bargaining between labor and capital -which takes place within the firm and in a society's political life -is what makes up the "social contract" that is required in order to legitimize the unequal distribution of income, wealth, and power that markets generate.
Still, there is an moral claim here. It is that the pre-Reagan/Thatcher politics of social democracy -the mixed economy of regulated markets and social safety nets that emerged in the west after World War II -was a failure. The free-market fundamentalist contends that social democracy's emphasis on the distribution of wealth actually makes the poor worse off. In contrast, it is said, de-regulated capitalism makes for faster economic growth, and that growth improves life for everyone -especially the poor.
Thus, the Party of Davos looks down from its conference rooms on the unruly crowd below and assures the world that while the protesters may prance and demonstrate and pretend to be concerned for the world's downtrodden, it is Davos that is working to promote economic growth, which is the poor's only salvation. To the economically unsophisticated, says Davos, it may seem cruel to force free trade and deregulation and austerity on the world's destitute, but we are doing it for their own good.
The Davos Record
We Even World Bank president James Wolfensohn in 1999 was moved to admit, "At the level of people, the system isn't working" (Hoagland 1999) . A telling phrase, suggesting that there are other "levels" at which the system is working perfectly well.
The NAFTA Model
One place to see the process more clearly is here on our own continent, where in January the North American Free trade Agreement (NAFTA) will be ten years old.
Like the WTO, NAFTA does more than just govern trade among its three members -Canada, Mexico and the United States. If NAFTA had only been concerned with free trade, the agreement could have been written on a few pages. Instead, NAFTA is a 1000 page template for the constitution of an emerging continental economy.
In fact, NAFTA was a model for the WTO. It is the explicit template for the In effect, NAFTA is a constitution that recognizes only one citizen -the multinational corporate investor. Governments will be punished for infringing on the rights of investors, whose protection is guaranteed. But governments may diminish, even abolish, the civil rights of workers or the claims of the environment with impunity. In contrast to the detailed protections for investors in NAFTA itself, the fig leaf of "side agreements" covering labor and the environment are weak and unenforceable.
Had this formula been proposed as the governing constitution of Canada, Mexico or the US, the electorates of each nation would have no doubt overwhelmingly rejected it.
But, by defining the debate over its adoption as a dispute between abstract notions of "free trade" and "protectionism," the promoters of NAFTA diverted attention from the larger political significance of the agreement.
To be sure, there was protectionist opposition to NAFTA in all three nations. But the traditional politics of previous trade battles, in which industrial sectors -including employers, workers and communities -who might lose from freer trade were pitted against industrial sectors that might win, was muted. The investor protections of NAFTA split off the interests of large US employers from their workers by allowing firms to shift production to lower cost Mexico. Thus, US auto firms' CEOs supported the treaty while US auto workers opposed it.
The opposition to NAFTA thus reflected a new class-based politics of trade in response to the more comprehensive reach of such agreements into the governance of domestic society. The opposition was led not by industrial "losers," but by the social movements -labor, environmentalists, consumers and nationalists in all three countries who were alarmed over the potential loss of national sovereignty and the domestic social contract.
The central claim for NAFTA was Davos-ian; the agreement would create a sustained economic boom in Mexico that would more than compensate for any social costs. One typical prediction, by a US Undersecretary of Commerce, was that Mexico would grow, "between a supercharged 6 percent a year, worthy of Asia's tigers, and a startling 12 percent per year comparable to China's recent economic growth" (Garten 1994 ). The growth would lift the country's poor (over 40 percent of Mexicans live on less than $2 a day) into the middle class.
The Mexican boom, in turn, would bring economic benefits to the US, and, to a lesser extent, Canada. First, the immigration of undocumented Mexican workers would diminish, if not disappear. (As writer Elizabeth Drew later observed, "Anti-immigration was a sub-theme used, usually sotto voce, by the treaty's supporters" [Drew 1994 ]. In 1990, Salinas asked an American audience: "Where do you want Mexicans working, in
Mexico or in the United States?" [Mayer 1998 ]) Second, NAFTA would create a new middle class market in Mexico for the more expensive goods produced in the US and Canada.
NAFTA at Ten
It is now painfully obvious that the promise of greater economic growth was not While the economic benefits fell short, the human and social costs of the continent-wide reallocation of investment rose dramatically. These costs included the destruction of livelihood of millions of workers, particularly in Mexican agricultural labor and US manufacturing. On both sides of the border, the promises made to these working populations were abandoned almost as soon as the ink was dry on the agreement. For example, Mexican farmers were promised that they would receive generous financial and technical assistance to help them meet competition from US agribusiness. But after the treaty was signed, funding for farm programs dropped dramatically. Meanwhile, the US Government massively increased subsidies for corn, wheat, livestock, dairy products and other farm products exported to Mexico. This, In the US, workers were betrayed by major multinational firms who had assured the US Congress that their interest in NAFTA was solely in the middle class Mexican market. Once the agreement was signed, these same firms began to shift production south of the border, eventually eliminating hundreds of thousands of jobs in the US. Clearly, the object of their desire was the low wage Mexican worker, not the mythical high wage Mexican consumer.
The net effect was to undercut wage levels on both sides of the border. Indeed, The problem of Mexican growth will not disappear with the revival of the US economy. Mexico's temporary faster growth in the late 1990s was a function of an extraordinary boom in the US that we now know was unsustainable. With generous injections of fiscal stimulus, US growth may accelerate for a while, but the chances of a return to those years of excessive speculation are remote. With the US trade deficit now expanding to worrisome levels, policymakers may soon be looking for more ways to limit imports. The ominous shifting of production from Mexican maquiladoras to even lowercost China is further evidence that the assumption that Mexico's needed growth would automatically flow from free trade was naïve.
Moreover, as in many developing countries, the largest part of Mexico's economic problem lies not in restricted export markets, but in the stifling maldistribution of wealth and power that restricts internal growth. The rich hardly pay any taxes. Despite the image of Mexico as a country with a strong state, the public revenue is 19 percent of GDP, compared with the more than 30 percent that the presumably more conservative American public sector takes (OECD 2002) .
Seeking an Alternative
Mexico cannot develop by sending its most ambitious and industrious workers to the United States. It is not the poorest and least educated that migrate; it is the workingclass risk takers -those who save up the $2,000 to pay a smuggler to take them across the river and who, once in the United States, sacrifice to send home their exploitation wages. Still, human rights and social justice will become part of the "constitution" of the global marketplace only when enough nation-states demand it. Therefore, the global opposition must pursue a common global program for working people that reinforces their national struggles for economic and social equity. Such a program would support national democratic movements and leaders who understand that national social contracts cannot be maintained in a global market that lacks one of its own, and that a global social contract cannot be established in the absence of effective social democracy at the national level. We cannot demand democracy at the IMF and not within the nations that belong to it.
The creation of a true global alternative requires a perspective through which the interests of workers in all countries are linked. In a global marketplace, workers' living standards increasingly rise and fall together. When workers in Brazil win a wage increase, it raises the bargaining power of workers in Germany. When workers in Indonesia improve their working conditions, workers in Nigeria benefit. Likewise, when the social safety net is strengthened in one country it helps those struggling for human economic and social rights in other countries as well.
In a world of countries desperate for investment, the development of a global political movement powerful enough to bring the investor class to the bargaining table is clearly a long way off. But, with a nod to Mrs. Thatcher, there is no alternative.
Given the huge influence of the US on the process of globalization, Americans have a special obligation, and opportunity, to shift the process away from the failed reactionary policies of the past two decades toward a vision in which the rights of ordinary people have as much claim on the world's resources as the demands of the "rich and powerful."
But the strategy cannot, in my view, be one in which America starts imposing left-wing ideas on the world instead of right-wing ideas. Rather, I believe that it is time for us to pull back from our current arrogant attempt to redesign the rest of the world and concentrate on a more feasible project -the building of a model of cross-border solidarity among the ordinary people of our own continent.
A Modest Continental Proposal
Despite the failure of NAFTA to deliver on the promises of its architects, it is here to stay. Every day more intracontinental connections in finance, marketing, production and other business networks are being hardwired for a consolidated North American market. Almost 70 percent of US imports from Mexico are within the same firm or related firms producing the same final product. Ford pick-up trucks are now assembled in Cuautitlan, Mexico with engines from Windsor, Ontario and transmissions from Livonia, Michigan. Labor markets are relentlessly merging, for professionals as well as migrant workers.
Post 9/11 border security concerns in the US slowed down the process. But commerce will prevail, and is now above pre 9/11 levels. Ultimately, the War on Terrorism is more likely to constrict the political freedoms of North Americans than the freedom of money and goods to cross their borders.
Moreover, the writing of the North American constitution continues. Out of the public eye, midlevel tri-governmental task forces and committees are discussing proposals ranging from guest-worker programs to continental transportation systems and the privatization of Canadian water and Mexican oil. Think-tanks, new academic institutes and business associations are debating ideas about the harmonization of taxes and regulation, monetary policies and a single currency. As the former Canadian Ambassador to the US recently commented: "Few days go by without new ideas for keeping NAFTA." The shared assumption is that the necessary political governance of the North American economy can be achieved by stealth, by grafting new agreements onto the basic NAFTA framework without stirring up public concerns over sovereignty and accountability.
But, sooner or later, the question of NAFTA's future must become part of the domestic politics of each nation. Sooner is better than later. We need a process in which electorates of all three countries share an honest dialogue over the common future that was denied them in the first NAFTA debate.
In all three countries, the sense that globalization is beyond the influence of the majority of people has disempowered the public discussion of how to shape a common future. A focus on the question: "What do we want North America to look like ten or twenty years from now?" might be a way to revive that discussion and eventually generate the basis for a new and more comprehensive bargain among all people of the three countries.
Shortly after his election, Mexican president Vicente Fox suggested that NAFTA countries adopt a version of the European Union's "cohesion funds" program for investment in poorer areas. Mexico -even more than did the poorest nations of Western Europe -needs substantial investment in education, health and infrastructure to create sufficient jobs for its people.
Fox's proposal was rejected in both Washington and Ottawa. It may be time to revive that suggestion to create a new Grand Bargain. In return for long term financial assistance for Mexico's public investment, the working people of Canada and the United States would get an agreement on enforceable labor and environmental standards, so that as Mexico grows, wage levels and working conditions will rise -creating a middle class market in Mexico and preventing the undercutting of labor standards north of the border.
It could also build a middle class constituency for modern tax, legal and public administration systems. The credible prospect of widely shared prosperity in Mexico that is creating enough jobs for its people would, in turn, make the achievement of a satisfactory accord on migration much easier.
Debate over a new bargain might also recognize that democracy is incompatible with Chapter 11 and other NAFTA provisions that undermine the authority of the local 20 public sector. And it might initiate an honest effort to apply the principles of sustainability to the continent's economic growth.
A continent-wide project for economic and social justice has another great advantage. It could provide a way to work out a model for the governance of a global economy that reconciles the tension between relentless drive of technology to expand the boundaries of the market and the human needs of a decent society. Focusing on building such a decent society in our own continental neighborhood could also help redirect our political energies away from the temptation of global empire.
And, just perhaps, if we could figure out how to achieve economic integration with social justice between two first world and one third world society on this continent, we might have something to contribute to the development of a just and prosperous global society.
